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Abstract—The overall performance of an Online Social Search
(OSS) system may suffer due to users’ non-cooperation, as in
the “tragedy of the commons” problem in social science. In this
paper, we study this non-cooperation problem. We propose an
analytical model that captures the behavior of OSS nodes, and,
from a gaming-strategy point of view, analyze various strategies
an individual node can utilize to allocate its awareness capacity.
Based on this we derive the Pareto inefficiency in terms of the
system cost. We also propose an incentive scheme which can lead
selfish nodes to the “social optimal” state of the whole system.
Extensive simulations show that the strategy with our proposed
incentive mechanism outperforms other strategies in terms of
the system cost and the search success rate. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study of the tragedy-of-the-commons
problem in OSS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social search (OSS) refers to information search
utilizing the underlying network structure of online social net-
works (OSN), and it has received attention in both research [1]
and actual applications [2]. In a typical OSS system, a person
looking for information sends the question to his selected
contacts. When a user receives a question on which he is an
expert, he responds to the questioner. He can also forward it
to his selected contacts. In this way, the question is passed on
in the social network. Finally, the questioner may be presented
with a great number of potential respondents.
In economics, a cost is an alternative that is given up as a
result of a decision [3]. As for OSS, cost can be interpreted in
different senses. For example, it can refer to the communica-
tion effort required by a node to become aware of the expertise
of other nodes, and it can also refer to OSS nodes’ privacy
exposure [4]. Naturally, each participating node wishes to min-
imize its own cost. Our previous work studied the performance
of OSS [5] [6], but certain issues of the basic cooperative
mechanism among OSS nodes are still unaddressed. Tragedy
of the commons [7] is one such issue. The phenomenon of
tragedy of the commons is a kind of non-cooperativeness, in
particular, a situation in which multiple rational individuals
inevitably exhaust a limited public resource even though it is
contrary to their long-term goals. In OSS, for example, if every
node spends less effort on communicating with others in order
to incur a lower cost, it is highly possible that a question will
be forwarded to a person who is not expert on it, and thus the
forwarding path for this referral session could be very long and
the performance of the system is unsatisfactory. This leads to
tragedy of the commons.
Tragedy of the commons is well studied in social science but
has not received attention in OSS. In this work, we study this
non-cooperation problem in the OSS scenario. We propose an
analytical model to capture the behavior of OSS nodes. Based
on this model, we analyze various strategies an individual node
can utilize to allocate its awareness effort or capacity from a
gaming-strategy point of view, and derive the strategy under
Nash equilibrium. We contend that such Nash equilibrium is
Pareto inefficient [8], namely, a node’s unilateral action (i.e.,
only considering its own interest) will degrade the system’s
performance. To strike a balance between the cost and the
performance, we propose an incentive scheme under which
the optimal state of individual nodes is also optimal for the
whole system. We also conduct extensive simulations under
various settings. The result validates our analyses, and further
shows that the strategy with our proposed incentive mechanism
outperforms other strategies in terms of the system cost and
the search success rate.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We
present the analytical model in Section II, followed by the
analyses of the tragedy-of-the-commons problem and the
proposed incentive mechanism in Section III. The evaluation
is presented in Section IV. Finally, we conclude this study
with suggestions for future work in Section V.
II. MODEL
We consider an OSN as an undirected graph G(V, E), where
V is the set of nodes (OSN users) and E ⊆ V ×V is the set of
edges (social ties) in the network. Let n = |V|. We also denote
by Nu ⊆ V the set of neighbors of Node u, and du = |Nu|.
Since a node maintains its local social network, we equip the
nodes with the intelligence of awareness. Denote by Su(v, i)
Node u’s awareness of its neighbor v, with respect to Question
i. We study the most general case and classify nodes’ aware-
ness into three types. In other words, we divide a node’s neigh-
bors into three possible sets, namely, experts (Su(v, i) = 1),
non-experts (Su(v, i) = −1), and unknown (Su(v, i) = 0). Let
R = [r1, r2, ..., rm] and E = [e1, e2, ..., em] be the distribution
of nodes’ awareness level and the expert density distribution
over m posed questions, respectively. c =
∑m
i=1 ri, which
represents the average capacity of a node’s awareness towards
another node. The detailed description of the awareness level,
the expert density, and the OSS referral strategy is presented
in [5].
Definition 1. Node u’s individual awareness level of its
neighbors’ expertise in Question i is defined as
rui 
δui
du
,
where δui = |{euv|v ∈ Nu and Su(v, i) = 0}|.
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Besides we set a new constraint
m∑
i=1
rui = cu,
which represents the capacity [4] of Node u’s awareness
towards its neighbors.
Denote by mu the number of questions posed by Node u
in the system, and
∑
u∈V mu = m. Suppose the number of
questions in the system is very large, which means that an
individual node requires a large capacity (cu) to gain enough
awareness of its neighbors. In addition, a rational node may
avoid asking too many questions in order not to strain the
willingness of possible responders. Thus we can assume that
the individual capacity is larger than the number of questions
a node raises to the network, that is, cu > mu.
It can be observed that in the case of homogeneous settings
of d (the number of a node’s neighbors), the awareness level
on Question i is the arithmetic average of the individual
awareness levels of nodes in the system, that is
ri =
∑
u∈V δui
nd
=
1
n
∑
u∈V
rui. (1)
Further we can obtain
c =
m∑
i=1
ri =
1
n
m∑
i=1
∑
u∈V
rui =
1
n
∑
u∈V
m∑
i=1
rui =
1
n
∑
u∈V
cu.
Based on the assumption of cu, we can see that c > mn .
Definition 2. The cost of a referral session for Question i,
denoted by C(i), is defined as the expected number of nodes
Question i has visited upon termination of this referral session.
We further denote by C the system cost. C = 1m ·
∑m
i=1 C(i),
i.e., the average cost of a referral session in the system. Given
the distribution of awareness level and expert density, we can
calculate the system cost by the following formula derived
in [4]
C(E ,R) = 1
m
·
m∑
i=1
1
(1 + rid)ei
(2)
As in [4] in which the cost reflects the exposure degree of
nodes’ privacy, C also measures the network resource (e.g.,
communication cost incurred by users of OSS who contact
their neighbors) consumption from a networking point of view,
and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 [4]. The optimal distribution of nodes’ aware-
ness level that minimizes the system cost satisfies
ri = (
m
d
+ c) ·
√
1
ei∑m
j=1
√
1
ej
− 1
d
, i = 1, ...,m (3)
III. PARETO INEFFICIENCY
In this section, we study the problem of Pareto inefficiency
in terms of the system cost because of nodes’ selfish behavior.
We first describe the problem under the assumption of homo-
geneous setting of d, and then we discuss possible approaches
to mitigate the inefficiency.
A. Tragedy of the commons
The phenomenon of the “tragedy of the commons” [7]
is a situation in which multiple rational individuals, acting
independently to pursue their own interest, inevitably exhaust a
public limited resource even though it is contrary to their long-
term goals. The concept is first proposed and studied in social
science since it occurs in many natural and social systems
(e.g. a common pasture overgrazed by selfish herdsman and
the failure of negotiation among nations on global environ-
mental pollution issues). In a more general and game-theoretic
perspective, the tragedy of the commons refers to a dilemma
where the Nash equilibrium achieved in the system may turn
out to be inefficient overall because of the selfish actions of in-
dividual players in the game. In the field of communication and
computer networks, [9], [10] and [8] respectively studied the
problem of noncooperative routing, load balancing, and flow
control as examples of strong Pareto inefficiency. [8] further
proposed a general framework of strongly Pareto-inefficient
Nash equilibria. While previous work focused on the Pareto
inefficiency in traditional transportation and communication
networks, here we address this question in the OSN scenario.
To study this problem in more details, we have to introduce
the definition of Pareto efficiency first.
[Pareto efficiency] [8] Denote by λ the strategy profile of
the noncooperative game and C the set of feasible values of λ.
Let Ui(λ) denote the utility function of player i. Then, in the
case where ∀i, Ui(λ∗) ≥ Ui(λˆ) and ∃i, Ui(λ∗) > Ui(λˆ), λ∗
is Pareto superior to λˆ. In the case where there exists λ ∈ C
s.t. λ is Pareto superior to λˆ, λ is Pareto efficient. In the case
where ∀i, Ui(λ∗) > Ui(λˆ), we say that λ∗ is strongly Pareto
superior to λˆ. In the case where there exists λ ∈ C s.t. λ is
strongly Pareto superior to λˆ, we say that λˆ is strongly Pareto
efficient.
Informally speaking, Pareto efficient situations are those in
which it is impossible to make one person better off without
necessarily making someone else worse off. That means the
so called “Pareto improvement” cannot be further achieved.
Theorem 2. To achieve the Pareto efficient situation of the
system cost, all nodes in the system are required to contribute
up to the capacity of their awareness towards their neighbors.
Proof: [4] has deduced the expressions of the minimum
value of privacy exposure degree. Since a Pareto efficient
strategy profile represents the “social optimal” state in the
network, we can use it to calculate the system cost, that is
Cmin =
1
m(m + dc)
·
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
. (4)
Suppose that certain nodes do not contribute their awareness
up to the capacity, namely,
∑m
i=1 r
∗
i = c
∗ < c. Denote
by R∗ = [r∗1 , r∗2 , ..., r∗m] the optimal distribution of nodes’
awareness level defined by Eqn. (3). Combining with Eqn.
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(4) we obtain
C∗min =
1
m(m + dc∗)
·
( m∑
i=1
√
1
ei
)2
> Cmin.
We can see that the system with R∗ incurs higher cost, which
is Pareto inefficient.
From Theorem 2 we can see that to achieve the mini-
mum system cost, each node is required to gain a thorough
knowledge about the expertise of its neighbors in order to
avoid blind search. However, in a realistic network scenario,
a node needs to communicate with his neighbors to obtain
knowledge about their expertise, which may incur certain
communication overhead. For example, in a wireless network
scenario, a mobile node may consume its battery power
as well as wireless bandwidth to communicate with other
nodes. Denote by CE(i) the communication effort of Node
i. Suppose Node 1 through Node i − 1 have raised a total
of k − 1 questions (i.e.
i−1∑
j=1
mj = k − 1) and Node i poses
Question k, k + 1, . . . , k + mi − 1 (totally mi questions) to
the system. Considering both the question forwarding cost (or
privacy exposure degree [4]) and the communication effort,
combining (1) and (2), we define the utility of an individual
node as,
Ui = −
k+mi−1∑
s=k
C(s)− CE(i)
= −
k+mi−1∑
s=k
1
(1 + dn
∑
u∈V rus)es
−D ·
m∑
j=1
rij
(5)
In (5) we model CE(i) as the sum of the awareness levels
Node i pays to all m questions in the system mainly to reflect
the fact that the more a single node knows about its neighbors,
the more effort it should exert since nodes may have to spend
their own resources contacting neighbors in order to gain an
understanding of their neighborhoods’ expertise level. D ≥ 0
is the price coefficient.
Lemma 1. The Nash equilibrium of the game among nodes
of the OSS exists.
Proof: The action of Node i is denoted as λi =
(ri1, ri2, . . . , rim), in which 0 ≤ rij ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, so
the set of actions of Player i is a nonempty compact convex
subset of an Euclidian space, and the utility function of Node
i is continuous and quasi-concave, satisfying the sufficient
condition in [11]. So the strategic game has Nash equilibrium.
In a strategic game, an obvious choice of action for a
rational node is to be “selfish”, which in our case means that a
node may only spend “optimal” effort (the optimal value will
be calculated shortly) to obtain knowledge of the potential
expertise of its neighbors with regard to the question it poses,
and no effort on unrelated questions.
Theorem 3. The strategy λˆi which constitutes
the Nash equilibrium should be in the form
(0, 0, . . . , ri,k, ri,k+1, . . . , ri,k+mi−1, . . . , 0), where Question
k, k + 1, . . . , k + mi − 1 are mi questions Node i poses on
the system.
Proof: From Lemma 1 we can see that the Nash equi-
librium of the game exists. The next step is to find the
corresponding strategy. Suppose that Node i chooses a dif-
ferent action λi = (ri1, ri2, . . . , rim), s.t. ∃j = k, k +
1, . . . , k + mi − 1, rij = 0, from the utility function (5)
we can see that Node i can obtain a better payoff by set-
ting rij = 0. Thus λi is a strictly dominated action and
cannot be used in any Nash equilibrium. Thus the strategy
which constitutes the Nash equilibrium should be in the form
(0, 0, . . . , ri,k, ri,k+1, . . . , ri,k+mi−1, . . . , 0).
From Theorem 3, in Nash equilibrium, we can simplify the
utility function of Node i (5) so that
Ui = −
k+mi−1∑
j=k
[
1
(1 + dnrij)ej
+ D · rij ] (6)
We assume d · rij = δij 	 n, which holds in large OSN and
allows us to do the approximation on (6), that is
Ui = −
k+mi−1∑
j=k
[
1
ej
(1− d
n
rij) + D · rij ]
= −
k+mi−1∑
j=k
[
1
ej
+ (D − d
nej
) · rij ]
(7)
Suppose D − dnej > 0, then the maximum of (7) is achieved
when rij = 1, j = k, k + 1, . . . , k + mi − 1 (note that we
have assumed that ci > mi). Denote the awareness level in
Question j, individual awareness level of Node i, the system’s
awareness level under the “selfish” strategies of nodes in the
system as rˆj , cˆi, cˆ, respectively, we can further obtain that
rˆj =
1
n
∑
u∈V
ruj =
1
n
, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
cˆi =
m∑
j=1
rij = mi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
cˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci =
m
n
According to our previous assumption on ci, we can see that
in the Nash equilibrium of the game among nodes in OSS,
all nodes choose to reserve their ability of knowing their
neighbors. Based on Theorem 2, the minimum system cost
cannot be achieved, which means that the outcome of the game
is Pareto inefficient.
B. Incentive mechanism
Classical economic theory states that in an economic sys-
tem, it may not be sufficient to make a change aimed at
improving economic efficiency while ensuring that nobody
is harmed merely with the “invisible hand”, some specific
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incentive, for example, compensation from third parties, may
be required. This gives us the first clue on proposing a
mechanism which can solve the tragedy of the commons.
Assume Node i allocates its awareness level following the
rule similar to the inverse square root law in (3), that is
rij = (
m
d
+ ci) ·
√
1
ej∑m
k=1
√
1
ek
− 1
d
, (8)
we can derive that rj =
1
n
n∑
i=1
rij = (
m
d
+c)·
√
1
ej∑m
k=1
√
1
ek
− 1
d
,
which corresponds to the optimal distribution of rj according
to (3). An obvious mechanism for the system operator is to
give a large enough incentive to encourage nodes to follow
the above distribution law, because proper incentives can
guarantee that the optimal state of individual nodes is also
optimal for the whole system
Proposition 1. Suppose Node i raises Question k, k + 1,
. . . , k+mi−1. Under the mechanism that the system operator
will compensate all the communication effort (CE(i)) of Node
i plus some bonus Bi > 0 if and only if Node i allocates
its individual awareness level (ri1, ri2, . . . , rim) following
rule (8), the equilibrium strategy of Node i should follow
the instruction of the operator if and only if Bi satisfies the
following expression
Bi ≥
k+mi−1∑
s=k
(C∗(s)− Cˆ(s))−D ·mi,
where C∗(s) and Cˆ(s) stand for the cost of referral sessions
for questions raised by Node i under the strategies of fol-
lowing system operator’s instructions and the “selfish” action
according to Theorem 3, respectively.
Proof: Denote by λ∗i = (r∗i1, r∗i2, . . . , r∗im) the ac-
tion of Node i following operator’s instructions, and λˆi =
(rˆi1, rˆi2, . . . , rˆim) as the “selfish” action of Node i according
to Theorem 3. Combining (5) and the mechanism proposed in
Proposition 1, we can calculate the utility functions under two
strategies
U∗i = −
k+mi−1∑
s=k
C∗(s) + Bi
= −
k+mi−1∑
s=k
∑m
j=1
√
1
ej
(m + dc)
√
es
+ Bi
(9)
Uˆi = −
k+mi−1∑
s=k
Cˆ(s)−D ·mi
= −
k+mi−1∑
s=k
1
(1 +
d
n
)es
−D ·mi
(10)
From (9) and (10) we can easily observe that if B ≥
k+mi−1∑
s=k
(C∗(s) − Cˆ(s)) − D · mi, the “selfish” strategy of
Node i is always strictly dominated by following the operator’s
rule. Combining with Theorem 3 we can further conclude that
the equilibrium strategy of Node i is to follow the operator’s
instruction.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we study the effect of node’s awareness
distribution on the system cost and average individual utility.
In the simulation, 20 questions are randomly posed, with
e = 5×10−4, 1×10−3, ..., 1×10−2 (20 values with increment
of 5×10−4). Since we assume that a single node’s awareness
capacity should be more than the number of questions it asks,
to simplify the simulation, we set an extra constraint that
each node in the system can ask no more than one question.
Also we set the price coefficient in (5) to 2. For comparison,
we utilize four different allocation strategies of individual
awareness level ri, namely, the “selfish” strategy according
to Theorem 3 (referred to as Selfish distribution), “optimal”
strategy according to (8) (referred to as Optimal distribution),
allocating the individual awareness level randomly subject to
the capacity constraint (referred to as RAFC strategy) and
subject to a predetermined value which is less than the capacity
(referred to as RALC strategy). The results are obtained as
averages of 1000 simulation runs. Figure 1 shows the average
individual utilities under the four individual awareness level
allocations based on a k-regular graph of 1× 104 nodes. The
x-axis represents the average individual awareness capacity
c. We can see that the average individual utility with the
Selfish allocation of ri is the highest among the four allocation
strategies. This verifies Theorem 3 that the selfish strategy
constitutes the Nash equilibrium of the game among nodes
since this action is the best action for an individual node.
Figure 2 presents the simulation results of system cost
under different individual awareness level distributions. We
observe that the Optimal allocation incurs the lowest system
cost among all four distributions. This verifies Theorem 1
that the Optimal distribution minimizes the system cost. In
addition, we observe that although the system cost obtained
under the RAFC strategy is higher than the Optimal allocation,
it is still less than the Selfish and RALC strategy, which
matches Theorem 2 that says all nodes in the system are
required to contribute up to their awareness capacity towards
their neighbors to achieve the Pareto efficient situation in terms
of the system cost. We also notice that the average perfor-
mances under the strategy of Optimal and RAFC improve
as c increases, while the system costs under the Selfish and
RALC strategy remain almost the same. Intuitively, the more
familiar a node is about its neighbors, the less hops it takes
for a question to find the right expert. However, if every node
in the network chooses to reserve its awareness ability, the
performance of the system cannot improve even with a higher
awareness capacity.
Inspired by [5], we also study the average search success
rate of referral sessions for the four awareness level distri-
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Fig. 1. Comparison of individual utilities under different awareness allocation
strategies
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Fig. 2. Comparison of system costs under different awareness allocation
strategies
bution strategies. Figure 3 compares the search success rates
of different allocation strategies. We observe that the search
success rate of the Optimal allocation is much higher than that
of the Selfish allocation. The result is quite counter-intuitive
at first sight, because a node who utilizes the selfish strategy
can have a thorough knowledge on expertise of its neighbors,
which seems to guarantee a high likelihood for the question to
reach a right expert. A possible explanation is that although
a single node can get the highest possible awareness level
(i.e. 100%) of its neighbors’ expertise, all the other nodes
choose to spend no effort to gain knowledge on these unrelated
questions. The ignorance of all other nodes in the system
causes the deterioration of the overall performance in terms
of average search success rate. The result of search success
rate under RAFC and RALC also substantiate our assertion
that nodes in the system should contribute all their individual
awareness capacities and cooperate with each other to achieve
a satisfactory search success rate.
V. CONCLUSION
We study the tragedy-of-the-commons problem in online
social search. We propose an analytical model to capture
the behavior of OSS nodes. From a gaming strategy point
of view, we derive the Pareto inefficiency in terms of the
system cost due to the non-cooperation among OSS nodes. To
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Fig. 3. Comparison of search success rates under different awareness
allocation strategies.
solve this inefficiency, we propose an incentive scheme under
which the optimal state of individual nodes is also optimal
for the whole system. We also evaluate various awareness
allocation strategies a node can utilize. The results of extensive
simulations validate our analysis, and further show that the
strategy under our proposed incentive mechanism outperform
other strategies in terms of the system cost and the search
success rate. In this paper, we describe a centralized scheme,
i.e., the system operator has to provide the participating nodes
with the incentives. In the future, we would like to develop a
distributed mechanism where the incentives are provided by
other nodes in the system [12]. In addition, we will further
evaluate the system based on real-world OSNs.
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